



**Incorporating Forced Migrants into Migration and Development:
New Policy Arguments**

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Migration in Europe

Migration continues to be at the forefront of the European Union's political agenda. Once a centre of emigration during the beginning and middle of the 20th century, Europe has now become a preferred destination for migration. These shifting patterns of immigration have now directed migrants from Africa, Latin America, and Asia to the outermost borders of the EU. The motivation to migrate can vary greatly between individuals: some seek a more stable life in Europe, while others are forced to flee from war, ethnic conflict, and poverty. Some hope to find employment in order to remit a portion of their income to their families in their country of origin.

Many Europeans are convinced that migration will have a negative impact on their country. Politicians, policymakers, and the public are made anxious by vivid media images they see of African migrants landing on the shores of Southern European countries such as Spain and Malta. Alarmist reports from both the media and policymakers have created a hostile attitude amongst many Europeans towards migrants. The usage of certain words to describe migration such as "tides," "waves," and "swells" has led to the impression that Europe is being inundated with migrants. This has created negative stereotypes of migrants and their motivations, as well as an anxiety felt by a large portion of the European public who fear the loss of cultural and national stability. The physical distinction of migrants entering from the global South from native Europeans has deepened this anxiety even further.¹

¹ Castles, S. (2003). The international politics of forced migration. *Development*, 46(3), 11-20.

Whilst EU countries have a right and duty to control the flow of migration and be aware of who is entering their territory, it is important to adopt a positive strategic plan which will address the root causes of migration and not simply the symptoms. Yet, the EU has responded to the influx of migrants with mostly restrictive measures. It has sought to strengthen its border control by creating Frontex, the EU's border protection agency that is responsible for reducing irregular migration. Frontex's mandate lies largely with coordinating the actions of the border authorities in each Member State. However there is a call within the EU to provide Frontex with increased funds to purchase more patrol boats, helicopters, and personnel. Their stated purpose is to prevent irregular migration and also to protect those who risk their lives immigrating in dangerous circumstances. Currently the EU grants more funds to its border protection authorities than to other issues on its migration agenda, such as refugee protection, development in third countries and international cooperation.²

The EU has adopted a migration management scheme that tries to extend its entry and denial points as far away from the continent as possible. In addition to restrictive measures, it accomplishes this through outsourcing border protection responsibilities to other states, most notably to those in the global South. Ghana, for example, established a Migration Information Bureau to assist the Ghanaian public with understanding migration matters while soliciting the assistance of EU Member missions. Mauritanian authorities have been tasked with stopping the flow of migration on its way towards the Canary Islands and Spain.³

By extending the walls of 'Fortress Europe' beyond the continental territory, the EU aims to protect the economic and cultural stability of Europe. Outsourcing the responsibilities inherent within such a task to countries in the global South – a primary source of immigration – relieves the EU of a major humanitarian and legal burden. *The onus of wrongdoing towards migrants and asylum-seekers then falls with countries of origin or transit.* While this approach may seem pragmatic from a European perspective, critics have accused the EU of shifting the main burden on countries with less resources, a weaker human rights track record, and also of treating migration as a problem to be solved rather than a naturally occurring phenomenon to be guided.

Migration and Development

The EU is increasingly recognising development – in conjunction with other measures – as a means to manage migration. The continuous flow of irregular migration, together with the acknowledgment of its rapidly aging labour force, prompted the EU to explore ways in which it could reduce South-North migration into Europe by diverting development aid to manipulate migration it for its own needs.

The 2005 *Green Paper on the EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration*⁴ is one of the EU's first attempts at formulating a policy on admitting migrant workers into Europe. Migration and development received acknowledgement, albeit very little, in the EU's publication of *The Hague Programme*⁵ four months later.

Yet, it was not until the European Commission's release of *Migration and Development*⁶ and the EU Council's endorsement of *The Global Approach to Migration*⁷, towards the end of 2005, that migration and development became an issue of primary concern within the EU. Both documents sought to address the 'root causes' of South-North migration into Europe while also acknowledging the potential benefits of remittances, Diasporas, and brain circulation for the development of both Europe and countries of origin. More importantly, however, is the EU's attempt to develop partnerships with African countries.

² Europa World (15/12/06). *European Migration Policy Receives Funding*. <http://www.europaworld.org/week289/europeanmigration151206.html>

³ Europa. (10/07/06). *Mauritania: New Measures to Combat Illegal Immigration towards the EU* IP/06/967.

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/967&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>

⁴ COM (2004) 811 final

⁵ COM (2005) 184 final

⁶ COM (2005) 390 final

⁷ 15914/1/05, REV 1; See also *The Global Approach – One Year On*, COM (2006) 735 final

Successive conferences held in 2006 in Rabat, Morocco⁸, and in Tripoli, Libya⁹ between the EU and African Union attempted to establish an understanding between the two regions regarding migration and development. Poverty reduction, circular migration, facilitating the role of Diasporas in development, remittances, and limiting 'brain drain' were among the issues discussed. The 2006 UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, a follow-up to the 2003 Global Commission on International Migration, raised this discourse to the highest global level and concluded, amongst other things, that migration can be used as a positive force for development if it was properly managed. The first Global Forum on Migration and Development, to be hosted by the Government of Belgium, will serve as a means to continue the discussion informally between senior-level government officials.

Europe's Response

The EU has an important role to play in the global migration and development discourse. Once itself a source of emigration, Europe must confront the reality that it is now a region where individuals and families from the developing world want to settle. It should also consider that migration is not simply a problem to be solved or which can easily be stopped, but rather a natural human phenomenon that has occurred over many centuries and will continue to in the future. People overcome large obstacles in order to migrate, and unless the EU adopts extremely restrictive measures, there will be little it can do to 'solve' or even limit its migration crisis.

Restrictive measures have been the underlying basis to the EU's response to South-North migration. Reducing irregular migration continues to be a top priority. There is nothing inherently negative to this approach – each Member State is responsible for protecting its sovereignty, and the EU works to ensure the same for the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, States must be responsible for creating organised systems of entry and exit that respect the fundamental human rights of all. This ideal has been difficult to achieve within the EU, given each Member State's differing priorities and objectives, and especially each State's need for labour; a need that is at times fulfilled by employers at the expense of human rights.¹⁰ Repressive border measures may deter people from migrating by legal means, and it may also induce prospective migrants to consider travelling by illegal means. Human smuggling, which in some cases may also lead to sex trafficking, may occur with greater frequency if the means to migrate legally have reduced.

What may prevent the EU from applying even more restrictive border measures is its need for migrant labour due to the rapid aging of its population. With this in mind, the EU has begun to consider the nexus between migration and development. The recent opening of a job centre in Mali is the EU's first step in regulating the number and type of workers who wish to enter Europe.¹¹ Each European country will be required to submit its quota for labour migrants. Upon the completion of their labour contract, migrants will be expected to return to their country of origin. Certainly, this approach is a positive step forward for the EU's migration management policy, as it attempts to open an additional entry for legal migration. Yet it also threatens to exploit migrants as mere units of labour, used simply to assume the jobs Europeans do not want and not to be welcomed into European society. Inherent within this approach is the EU's hope to foster 'temporary' migration, that is, to require migrants in Europe to agree to eventually return home after their contract is complete. However this type of selection mechanism does not consider enough factors, most notably its similar application in recent history and the needs and aspirations of migrants. The temporary guest worker program of the 1970s did little to fulfil the economic needs of Europe and even less for host countries' populations.¹² Assuming that migrants – especially those from poorer countries – will return home after working in Europe seems misplaced, especially if their home country or community lacks the infrastructure to support their needs.

⁸ Rabat Declaration, http://www.maec.gov.ma/migration/Doc/RABAT%20DECLARATION_EN.pdf

⁹ Tripoli Declaration, http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Conferences/Past/2006/November/SA/EU/Joint_declaration_Final.doc

¹⁰ BBC News. (19/03/07). *Migrant Workers Face New Slavery*. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/6401365.stm

¹¹ EU Business. (27/01/07). *EU to Open Job Centre in Mali to Promote Legal Migration*. http://www.eubusiness.com/news_live/mali-immigration.75

¹² Appleyard, R. (2001). International migration policies: 1950-2000. *International Migration*, 39(6), 7-20.

The EU's usage of development as a means to manage migration, either through 'temporary' or 'circulatory' policies, must be analysed critically. *Whereas the primary thrust of its migration management regime once focused on individuals, it is now poised to focus on select categories of groups.* This poses an enormous threat to villages and towns in the global South, who are burdened most by migration because they lack the resources to cope with it. Each skilled individual that departs a developing country for Europe increases the burden on his or her respective community. Nations in the global South especially lack the necessary resources to manage South-South migration, a pattern that often occurs before the transition to South-North migration. **Thus, the EU has used its development aid not to alleviate the migration burden imposed on the global South, but rather as a tool to manage migration into Europe.** The onus of responsibility continues to lie with countries of origin. While the migration crisis may appear to be severe in Europe, it poses even greater problems for countries in the developing world.

Refugees and Forced Migrants

The plight of refugees and forced migrants has not been taken into account by the EU's planning on migration and development. This is a group whose needs have been generally ignored, starting from the difficulties faced in agreeing on the development of a common European asylum system. Refugees and migrants are the most vulnerable group of South-South migrants, yet asylum-seekers continue to experience barriers when entering the EU and many are housed in detention centres as they await the status of their application. Refugees and other forced migrants, notably internally displaced persons (IDPs), are particularly vulnerable and need assistance more than most others. Whether fleeing from war, ethnic conflict, or political oppression, forced migrants are a population faced by very grave problems and needs and, more than other groups of migrants, they are the most unlikely to return home in the short term. When they do return home, they often face more difficulties and traumas than others.

The EU's unwillingness to include forced migrants into the migration and development discourse means that much of their development potential may be wasted. In many cases, forced migrants possess valuable skills, knowledge, and experience. Yet the process of forced migration – beginning with the initial emergency phase and ending with post-reconstruction – may deprive the forced migrant of the ability to meaningfully contribute either to their country of resettlement or country of origin. Years spent in a refugee camp can foster a sense of dependency within forced migrants, especially if they are not provided with the opportunity to use skills they already possess, or allowed to acquire new abilities. Former refugees or IDPs who return to homes that remain impoverished and without any structure will be unable to utilise any skills they may have learned within the camp. Those who perceive a lack of opportunity in their home community may consider migrating elsewhere. *More often than not, what begins as migration to another developing country, if there is no other alternative, ends as a journey to the developed world.*

A primary obstacle to including forced migrants into the migration and development agenda is the existing division between academic and policy circles participating in the discourse Governments, academia and civil society have thus far been unable to meaningfully bridge the gap between forced migration and development. Yet, with an increase in the incidence of conflict and civil strife within the global South, it is increasingly becoming bad policy to continue sustaining this gap. *Development is inherent within the application of all three possible durable solutions: local integration into the host society, voluntary return to the country of origin, and resettlement to a third country.* The ability of the forcibly displaced to contribute to the development of a host society, third country, or country of origin is vital for all stakeholders.

Incorporating Forced Migrants into Migration and Development

The EU can no longer afford to neglect the needs and potential of forced migrants. Including this population within the existing migration and development discourse is not only beneficial for Europe, but also for other countries, whether they are countries of resettlement or of origin. **Whether the EU is interested in reducing migration or improving the flow of legal labour migration into Europe, strengthening its focus on forced migrants through the lens of development has the potential to**

positively impact all stakeholders involved. The needs of transit countries must be seriously considered throughout this process, especially since they are often relied upon by the EU to manage migratory patterns into Europe. Directing attention to forced migrant communities in post-conflict situations, and also to South-South migration and Diasporas could be an optimal way by which the EU can include forced migrants into their migration and development agenda.

1. Communities in Post-Conflict Situations

Focusing on community development in post-conflict areas is essential to reduce irregular migration into the EU, and to maximise the potential of forced migrants through legal migration . .

Communities in post-conflict situations are especially vulnerable to socio-economic, physical, and political instability. Faced without any opportunities in their host or home country, forced migrants may be left with no other choice than to migrate to a more developed country regardless of whether doing so is illegal or not. Ignorant of or unable to access legal migratory channels, forced migrants may resort to the black market for their journey to a developed country. *Although there are numerous reasons why a former refugee or IDP may emigrate from his or her home or host country, it is clear that the lack of gainful opportunities upon return serves as the most effective catalyst for emigration.* A former refugee or IDP without any labour market skills may also tend to have difficulty reintegrating back into their home or host society. Without any human capital to invest, a forced migrant may decide to risk travel to a country or region where low-skilled labour is needed. While in the short-term this may be good for a country or region with low-skilled labour needs, in the long-term it may prove negative if migration patterns and routes are not managed in a way that protects both migrants, and receiving and origin countries. Receiving countries may then be faced with unwanted migration, while origin countries might experience 'brain drain.' In the end, the migrant becomes isolated from their own home, and in a host country that prohibits inclusion.

Most notably, enacting a policy of development in post-conflict communities can even reduce an individual or group's need to migrate. Individuals with skills and talents can contribute to their community's well-being by starting entrepreneurial enterprises, boosting existing segments of the community's labour economy, and participate in the implantation of development initiatives. An individual or family is less likely to migrate if there are opportunities to be sought in their home community. Similarly, if an individual or family can also experience basic and fundamental rights in their home community, then there is less of a likelihood that they will migrate to other countries. And consequently there may even be reduced incidences of 'brain drain.' Development and the implementation of basic and fundamental rights are important to the vitality of post-conflict communities, and it's a step the EU can take to benefit itself while also helping communities in post-conflict situations. But how can the EU begin to consider implementation?

Collaborating with NGOs working with post-conflict communities on migration and development is an ideal first step. The linkage of migration practises and development practises – long regarded as separate – can allow for the exchange of experiences inputs between the EU institutions and NGOs who work with communities in post-conflict situations. *As a lead stakeholder, the EU may consider creating an interactive forum for forced migrant and development NGOs and especially representatives from the forced migrant community.*

The purpose of such a forum can be to gather all stakeholders involved in the issues of migration and development and post-conflict communities to develop policies and actions that will directly impact the aforementioned issues. The EU, along with NGOs and forced migrant representatives can use the forum to implement actions with clear timelines and objectives for community development. Successful community development will require direct input and participation from the grassroots level. Together with NGOs and community representatives, the EU can begin to assess a community's needs and the level of attention each one requires. The key would be to act holistically, that is, in a manner that addresses all circumstances of the situation. Migration and development affects entire communities rather than just individuals, thus care should be taken to identify the specific linkages between migration and development in the post-conflict communities

How can such collaborative efforts be of any use? **Through collaboration with migration and development NGOs, the EU can utilise field and donor experiences to identify goals, targets, and**

objectives. Rebuilding a post-conflict community's infrastructure, strengthening its labour market and investment potential, providing vocational skills training, and lifting educational and health standards are just some of the concrete results a collaborative effort can produce. *Mobilization of the community becomes extremely vital.* Overcome with a sense of dependency due to years spent in camps, post-conflict community members will need great assistance with renewing their independence. Messages and actions encouraging self-determination should be frequently used. Leadership must be fostered within the community. The EU and NGOs on the ground can take the initial lead but, in order for community development efforts to be sustainable, the capacity to lead and self-sustain must exist within the local community.

2. South-South Migration

The literature on migration is consistent in acknowledging that South-South migration is “nearly as large” as South-North migration.¹³ Individuals in Africa may visit two or three other African countries before making the journey to Europe¹⁴. The same is true for migrants from Latin America and Asia. Since an individual cannot simply choose a migratory pattern as he or she would choose an airline flight, the migrant must be subject to the whims and conditions of human smugglers and traffickers who do not prioritise migrants' human rights.

The EU has focused too greatly on South-North migrations. While it is true that this migratory pattern has increased in prevalence during the past few decades, by focusing solely on this aspect the EU ignores an important trend of global migration. Border controls have been extended mostly to the shores of Western Africa and the Mediterranean. Through the coordination of Frontex, EU Member State marine vessels and aircraft are used to locate and apprehend groups of migrants sailing toward s countries such as Spain or Malta aboard extremely unsafe boats. *Whilst a lot of attention is given to this particular manifestation of migration, not much is given to what has precluded it.*

Migrants are extremely vulnerable during South-South migration. Although they face great danger and risk to life in the open sea, Frontex's increased maritime presence increases the probability of their detection. Journeying through transit countries, however, is especially dangerous because there is little oversight provided by Frontex and partnering border authorities. Asylum systems in transit countries may also be incompatible with internationally recognised standards, thereby endangering the lives of migrants when they need protection most. Movement through transit countries places migrants at great risk to physical and mental abuse, including exposure to life-threatening diseases and human exploitation. Migrants are then exposed to a new set of vulnerabilities when they reach the EU's borders: detention, abuse of human rights, denial of asylum, and forced return are just a few examples.

South-North migration must be viewed as the 'tip of the iceberg' of a long migratory process for many individuals and groups. Migrants' often journey through many countries before they reach Europe. If an individual or group is forced to migrate by irregular means, then most of their journey may occur in the Global South. **As the EU is primarily interested in reducing irregular migration, it should then increase its focus on South-South migration.** The opening of job centres in Mali and Mauritania appear to be an acknowledgement by the EU of the significance of this migratory pattern. But such efforts are only superficial at best and in reality appear to better serve the EU's labour needs rather than those of migrants. However, if the reduction of irregular migration continues to be a priority for the EU, more action must be taken to address South-South migratory movements.

A potential alternative for the EU is to strengthen its collaborative efforts with border authorities in the Global South. The central purpose of this recommendation should be to prioritise the

¹³ World Bank. (2007). *South-South Migration and Remittances*, p. 3; Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2006). Between a rock and a hard place: North Africa as a region of emigration, immigration, and transit migration. *Review of African Political Economy*, 33(108), 311-324; Broekhuis, A. et al. (2006). International migration and national development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Viewpoints and policy initiatives in the countries of origin. *Working Papers Migration and Development Series*, 15, 1-17; Adepouju, A. (2003). Migration in West Africa. *Development*, 46(3), 37-41;

¹⁴ De Haas, H. (2006). Trans-Saharan migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical roots and current trends. *Migration Information Source*, <http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=484>.

human rights of migrants first, rather than to simply turn them back. Collaborative border protection could be used to stem human smuggling and trafficking. Irregular migrants that are captured and judged to be free of malicious intent should be afforded measures that are supportive instead of punitive. Access to legal migratory channels and networks, humanitarian NGOs, medical care, and legal advice are just a few examples. Those who need to apply for asylum should be given the immediate opportunity to do so. Migrants that do not qualify for asylum or residence in another country must be assessed for other needs while continuing to receive appropriate care. *The protection needs of all migrants must always be considered and upheld.*

Just as with community development, the EU cannot implement these plans without partnering with local authorities and NGOs. All three stakeholders must work in unison to protect the safety of migrants. Inclusion of migrant representatives would add further legitimacy to implementation. Furthermore, exploring the potential of this alternative and other similar approaches are a positive way in which the EU can reduce irregular migration. Acknowledging its right and responsibility to protect the borders of its Member States, the EU must develop a coherent policy on the reduction of irregular migration. However such a policy must prioritise the human rights of migrants who in the end are more vulnerable than any Member State.

3. Strengthening Diasporas¹⁵

It is known that diasporas are a key component to the success of human migratory movements. Although JRS does not work directly with diaspora populations, its experience can allow it to reflect on their role and contribution to the migration and development discourse.

Most notably, diasporas are recognized for the large amount of remittances they send home to families. Equivalent to billions of US dollars, annual diaspora remittances total more than the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) sent to the world's least developed countries.¹⁶ The true value of global remittances remains unknown due to the existence of informal means of transmission. Yet officially recorded remittances from migrants to developing countries reached US \$260 billion in 2006.¹⁷ Remittances are typically used by families to attend to their most basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter. However these funds are also used for investment in communities, a powerful tool for development. Diaspora-led Hometown Associations all over the world have raised large sums of funds for their respective communities in their countries of origin. Schools, parks, medical facilities and even small businesses have received aid from diaspora remittances. *Once migrants themselves, diasporas retain a well-defined potential to positively impact the development of their home communities and countries.*

Remittances, however, have received too much prominence within the EU's migration and development agenda. They have cited the potential of remittance sending as the best reason to support diasporas. The EU has been criticised for wanting to replace ODA with remittances, and although they have never admitted to this, it is not difficult to imagine how critics view their proclaimed support of remittances as a wish to lessen the responsibility of providing ODA. *While remittances do provide much needed aid to poor families in developing countries, they cannot be used as a replacement for ODA or other economic and humanitarian aid.* Remittances are individually focused and do not affect whole communities as development aid would. The individualistic nature of remittances will do little to ease migration into Europe if the EU does not find alternative means to regulate it and empower diasporas that send them. Also, remittances are neither systematic nor guaranteed. Without any mechanism for control – which may be possible achieve – it will be hard to calculate if remittances are sufficient enough for needs and focused on the true necessities of the communities of origin. Therefore, remittances should be encouraged and assisted but not relied upon as the sole financial source for development.

¹⁵ For a more detailed elaboration of these ideas see, De Haas, H. (2006). *Engaging Diasporas: How Governments and Development Agencies can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development of Origin Countries*. International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, pp. 117.

¹⁶ De Bruyn, T, & Wets, J. (2006). Remittances and development. *Conference Report on Migration and Development*, pp. 6.

¹⁷ Rath, D. (2007). Leveraging remittances for development. *MPI Policy Brief*, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1100792545130/LeveragingRemittancesforDev.pdf>.

Communities are affected as a whole by migration and development, both in host and home societies. Therefore, just as in community development and South-South migration, alternative solutions should be community focused. diasporas are good examples of this: in many countries, diaspora communities are cohesive enough to make a strong impact on countries of origin. In essence, diaspora communities can leverage their influence as a closely-knit social group to positively affect the development of their countries of origin. Keeping in mind the EU's primary goal of reducing irregular migration while increasing access to legal labour migration, it should focus a significant portion of its attention to strengthening diasporas throughout Europe.

The EU should allow for greater freedom of movement between diasporas living in Europe and their respective homes. Identifying diasporas and boosting the capacity of already organised diasporas is a positive first step. Clarifying the definition of what composes a diaspora is a necessary accompaniment to this step, since the current understanding of what constitutes a diaspora may continue to remain vague. Additionally, and in allowing for greater freedom of movement, the EU should not be allowed to utilise diasporas for the sole purpose of meeting its own needs. The potential inclusion of diasporas into Civil Society as humanitarian actors in the EU, for example, raises the potential that their ability to positively impact the needs of forced migrant communities in home countries may be reduced to simple transactions of people and money. In this way diaspora communities in the EU can only act as sources of development funds, rather than as also sources of human capital such as knowledge, skills, and experience, among others.

The EU must take advantage of the strong connections diasporas already share with communities in their countries of origin. The development of programme proposals with diaspora communities in Europe can positively impact communities in the developing world. The EU can promote the creation of Hometown Associations and facilitate easier and safer transfers of remittances. Members of diaspora communities should be allowed free movement between their host and home society; they should feel empowered to spend time in their country of origin while having the opportunity to return to their host country in the EU. In this way, diaspora members can travel to their hometowns to implement and oversee development projects or deliver further aid.

Allowing for greater movement between diasporas and their home countries can improve the circulation not only of funds, but also non-material remittances. Knowledge, experience, and labour skills, among others, must all be considered to be of similar, or even greater, value than financial and material remittances. Empowered diasporas can form close partnerships with entrepreneurs, medical clinics, legal offices, and universities in their home country. This free exchange of ideas can promote development in poor communities, which in turn can help to reduce the need for migration into Europe.

Moreover, strengthened diasporas can play a vital role in the reduction of irregular migration. In particular successful diaspora communities can act as role models for their communities of origin. Together with the EU, diasporas can help to facilitate more open channels of legal migration, and the promotion of labour opportunities in Europe. Diasporas can use their resources to welcome new migrants by assisting them with finding employment and becoming integrated into European society. Diaspora-led support networks can be used to aid migrants in becoming accustomed to their new host society, even to the extent of learning the local language.

Conclusion

The issue of migration and development, by EU standards, is largely focused on migration. Restrictive border and immigration measures have not succeeded in reducing irregular migration. The unintended result is often to lead those desperate enough to resort to human smuggling and trafficking. The migration literature in academic and non-governmental policy circles is clear in its assertion that restrictive migration policies will only lead migrants to use more illegal and dangerous methods. Since 2005 the EU has adjusted its migration policy to include development. The connection of these practices, which until now have been treated as separate issues, have led to the formulation of new ideas for migration management. Circular and temporary migration, poverty reduction, vocational

training, and the improvement of brain circulation have taken prominence within the migration and development discourse. The EU's efforts to utilise the tools of migration and development is a very positive step, and one that promises to yield beneficial results for the migration needs of its Member States, and for countries of origin. Yet there are still issues for the EU to address before it can achieve success with migration and development.

The EU's primary interests lie with reducing irregular migration and supplying its shrinking labour force with legal migrants. Rapid aging of its population has forced the EU to acknowledge the need for migrant labourers, who must be employed by the millions within the next decade if Europe's labour market economy is to survive.¹⁸ The EU's actions clearly demonstrate its wish to satisfy these interests: border enforcement has been extended beyond the European territory and its actions have been outsourced to third countries. By extending 'Fortress Europe' the EU hopes to curb irregular migration, while simultaneously keeping a door open to migrants who wish to work in Europe legally.

Forced migrants have been mostly ignored from the migration and development discourse in Europe. Their rights under international law, as well as their interests, needs and aspirations have fallen on deaf ears within the EU. The omission of forced migrants from the EU's migration and development discourse can also be seen as an unfulfilled potential for both Europe and countries of origin. Forced migrants who eventually leave their camps often return to a home without any opportunities for employment, education, and productivity. Left without any outlets for skills learned inside the camps, forced migrants may choose to begin their journey to the Global North. What initially begins as a South-South migration eventually turns into South-North, whether by legal or illegal means.

JRS has been active in supporting forced migrant communities and including them into the migration and development discourse. The ideas and arguments addressed here reflect both JRS' existing and prospective work, and are especially directed towards the EU: focusing on communities in post-conflict, South-South migration, and strengthening diasporas.

Development in post-conflict communities seeks to address the root causes of migration by offering solutions that can affect entire communities, rather than only individuals. Migration is a process that affects everyone in a community, thus any solutions must also be community focused. Communities with strong infrastructures and opportunities for growth can lessen the need for individuals to migrate. Likewise, individuals with a solid foundation of skills and knowledge have more potential to contribute towards the development of their home communities. Grassroots mobilisation of aspiring local leaders can lead to the overall empowerment of forced migrant communities. Forced migrant representatives would have greater input towards their self-determination. The EU can begin to implement these solutions in partnership with civil society representatives such as JRS.

In addition to communities in post-conflict, the EU should increase its focus on South-South migration and on the strengthening of diasporas. Although the EU perceives the migration burden to be heaviest in Europe, the reality is that the global South bears the strongest burden due to their poor development status as well as the larger number of refugees hosted there. Migrants often travel through two or three countries before they reach the means to journey northward. Collaborating with border authorities in the global South, while simultaneously prioritising the fundamental human rights of migrants, is one way in which the EU can begin to focus on South-South migration. Ensuring open access to essential services and protecting those migrants who seek asylum must also be included.

Diasporas, alternatively, can be strengthened to have a greater impact upon their communities of origin. Already accustomed to transmitting billions in remittances annually, diaspora communities in Europe are an untapped potential for migration and development. Alongside material resources, diasporas can also transmit their knowledge, experiences and skills to their home communities. This free flow of funds and ideas can ultimately lead to increased development in the global South while simultaneously reducing irregular migration. The EU can also partner with diaspora networks in order to facilitate greater circular migration patterns between home and host societies – whilst allowing a better

¹⁸ COM (2004) 811 final. *Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration*.

flow of remittances to their countries of origin by controlling commission rates and charges on remittances. In this way Europe can ensure its labour market needs are fulfilled while also taking steps to protect its borders.

Summary of Major Arguments

Europe's response to migration: Migration and Development

- The EU's primary interests lie with reducing irregular migration and supplying its shrinking labour force with legal migrants.
- The application of restrictive border and immigration measures by the EU has not succeeded in reducing irregular migration.
- The EU's migration management scheme has extended its entry and denial points as far away from the continent as possible.
- In addition to restrictive measures, this has been accomplished through outsourcing border protection responsibilities to other states, most notably to those in the Global South.
- Outsourcing these responsibilities to third states relieves the EU of a major humanitarian and legal burden. The onus of wrongdoing towards migrants and asylum-seekers then falls with countries of origin or transit which do not always have a strong human rights track record.
- Seeking to shift its migration management strategy, the EU has diverted development aid to source nations of migration in the global South. This has been done not to alleviate the burden of migration imposed on the global South, but primarily as a tool to manage migration into Europe.

Refugees and Forced Migrants

- The plight, as well as the particular needs and rights of refugees and forced migrants have not been factored into the EU's planning on migration and development.
- The most unfortunate consequence to the EU's inability to include forced migrants into migration and development policies is that they are turned into unfulfilled potential.
- Years spent in a refugee camp can foster a personality of dependency within forced migrants, especially if they are not provided with the opportunity to use skills they already possess, or allowed to acquire new abilities.
- Former refugees or IDPs who return to homes in regions that remain impoverished and without any structure will be unable to utilise any skills they may have learned within the camp or host society.
- A primary obstacle to including forced migrants into the migration and development agenda is the existing separation between migration and development topics in academic and governmental policy circles..
- Yet with an increase in the incidence of conflict and civil strife within the global South, it has now become bad policy for the EU to continue sustaining this gap. Development is inherent within the application of all three durable solutions: local integration, voluntary repatriation and resettlement to a third country.

Incorporating Forced Migrants into Migration and Development

- Strengthening the EU's focus on forced migrants through the lens of development has the potential to positively impact all stakeholders involved.
- Directing attention to forced migrant communities in post-conflict situations, and furthermore to South-South migration and diasporas seem to be the most optimal means with which the EU can include forced migrants into their migration and development agenda.

Communities in Post-Conflict

- Although there are a number of reasons why a former refugee or IDP may emigrate from his or her home or host country, it is clear that the lack of gainful opportunities upon return serves as one of the most effective catalysts for emigration.
- Working with communities in post-conflict situations is a positive way in which the EU can reduce irregular migration while strengthening legal migratory channels.
- Collaborating meaningfully with NGOs working with post-conflict communities on migration and development is an ideal first step.

- In collaboration with NGOs, the EU can utilise field and donor experiences to identify goals, targets, and objectives to develop sound holistic policies on migration and development.
- Migration and development affects entire communities. Therefore the approach that is used by the EU must likewise take into account the needs of the entire community. Individuals will have less of a reason to leave communities that are strong. Equally, communities fare better at retaining its members if it can provide sufficient opportunities.

South-South Migration

- The EU has focused too greatly on South-North migration.
- Migrants experience extreme vulnerability during South-South migration.
- South-North migration must be viewed as the 'tip of the iceberg' of a long migratory process for many individuals and groups. If an individual or group is forced to migrate by irregular means, then most of their journey may occur within many countries in the Global South.
- What begins as a migration to another developing country more often than not, if there is not another alternative, ends as a journey to the developed world.
- As the EU is primarily interested in reducing irregular migration, it should then increase its focus on South-South migration.
- A potential alternative for the EU is to strengthen its collaborative efforts with border authorities in the global South. The central purpose would be to prioritise the human rights of migrants first, rather than to simply turn them back.
- Just as with community development, the EU cannot implement these plans without partnering with local authorities and NGOs.
- Acknowledging its right and responsibility to protect the borders of its Member States, the EU must develop a coherent policy on the reduction of irregular migration. However such a policy must prioritise the human rights of migrants who in the end are more vulnerable than any Member State.

Strengthening Diasporas

- Remittances are a promising tool for the successful implementation of migration and development policy. Yet they have favoured too prominently within the EU's migration and development agenda. Despite their utility, remittances should not be mistaken as the only tool of migration and development. Instead, it should be seen as one tool among others – part of a holistic application of migration and development.
- However since remittance sending is vital to the well-being of individuals, families and communities in countries of origin, the EU should help to control the high commissions and charges of remittances sent back to the migrants' countries of origin. Doing this can ensure that maximum use of this money's development potential is made.
- The EU should allow for greater freedom of movement between diasporas living in Europe and their respective homes. Identifying diaspora communities and boosting the capacity of already organised diasporas is a positive first step.
- Members of diaspora communities should be allowed free movement between their host and home society. In this way, diaspora members can travel to their hometowns to implement and oversee development projects or deliver further aid.
- Allowing for greater movement between diasporas and their home countries can improve the circulation of not only funds, but also non-material remittances.
- Moreover, strengthened diasporas can play a vital role in the reduction of irregular migration by helping to facilitate more open channels of legal migration, and the promotion of labour opportunities in Europe.

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